Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Elizabeth Warren: Minimum Wage Would Be $22 An Hour If It Had Kept Up With Productivity

from huffpost



The Huffington Post  |  By  Posted:   |  Updated: 03/19/2013 3:07 pm EDT
Elizabeth Warren Minimum Wage
Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) made a case for increasing the minimum wage last week during a Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions hearing, in which she cited a study that suggested the federal minimum wagewould have stood at nearly $22 an hour today if it had kept up with increased rates in worker productivity.
"If we started in 1960 and we said that as productivity goes up, that is as workers are producing more, then the minimum wage is going to go up the same. And if that were the case then the minimum wage today would be about $22 an hour," she said, speaking to Dr. Arindrajit Dube, a University of Massachusetts Amherst professor who has studied the economic impacts of minimum wage. "So my question is Mr. Dube, with a minimum wage of $7.25 an hour, what happened to the other $14.75? It sure didn't go to the worker."
Dube went on to note that if minimum wage incomes had grown over that period at the same pace as it had for the top 1 percent of income earners, the minimum wage would actually be closer to $33 an hour than the current $7.25.
It didn't appear that Warren was actually trying to make the case for a $22 an hour minimum wage, but rather highlighting the results of a recent study that showed flat minimum wage growth over the past 40-plus years coinciding with surging inequality across a number of economic indicators.
Warren went on to argue that raising the federal minimum wage to over $10 an hour in incremental steps over the next two years -- a cause championed by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address and since taken up in the Senate -- would not be as damaging for businesses as some critics have argued.
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Sunday, March 17, 2013

When in Doubt, File a Motion: Trends Concerning Automatic Stay Violations

from jdsupra.com


When in Doubt, File a Motion: Trends Concerning Automatic Stay Violations

Bankruptcy filings in Virginia, and nationwide, declined significantly in 2012, and it appears the decline is continuing in 2013.1  However, thousands of cases continue to be filed, and it is important for practitioners to continually assess recent developments and trends in the case law. A debtor files a bankruptcy petition seeking the automatic stay as his primary shield. As a result, violations of the stay are frequently alleged, and creditors must proceed cautiously once a bankruptcy petition is filed. This article focuses on recent decisions from the Bankruptcy Courts in Virginia concerning alleged violations of the automatic stay by creditors.

Litigation over alleged automatic stay violations appears to have been much more frequent over the past few years, and, as a result, the Courts have had an opportunity to provide additional clarity to creditors’ duties and debtors’ protections upon the filing of a petition. The Courts have addressed the requirements imposed by the stay with respect to garnishments, repossessed vehicles, administrative holds, removal of personal property from premises abandoned by the debtor, and a few unique situations that do not arise frequently but are instructive nonetheless. Ultimately, Judge Mayer succinctly summarized all of the recent litigation over the automatic stay by observing: “One cardinal rule of bankruptcy practitioners is, if there is doubt as to whether the automatic stay applies, file a motion.” Gordon Props., LLC v. First Owners Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred (In re Gordon Props., LLC), 460 B.R. 681, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (Mayer, J.)

Judge Mayer’s advice is particularly well-taken because of the strict standard employed when determining whether a creditor can be held in contempt for violation of the stay. In order to prevail, a debtor need only prove that a creditor committed an intentional act with knowledge of the automatic stay. In re Seaton(sometimes referred to as the “pink box case”), 462 B.R. 582, 592 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (St. John, J.). In that case, a landlord, under an apparently-mistaken belief that the debtor-tenants had moved out of their apartment, cleaned the apartment and removed the debtors’ remaining personal items, throwing them in a nearby dumpster. Id. at 586-88. The debtors filed a Motion for Sanctions against the landlord asserting that this action violated the automatic stay, and the landlord defended by asserting that it did not “intend to violate the automatic stay.” Id. at 592. The Court, however, held that the “absence of specific intent to violate the automatic stay . . . fails to negate the willfulness of the actions.” Id. While not considered by the Court when determining whether an award of actual damages was appropriate, the landlord’s specific intention was considered by the Court when it refused to award punitive damages. Id. at 603-04.

The clear standard articulated by Judge St. John, however, is more difficult to apply in the garnishment context because debtors generally assert that a creditor’s inaction violates the automatic stay. While it is clear that a judgment creditor “may not elect to take no action or refuse to cooperate” and shield itself from liability for an alleged violation of the automatic stay, In re Williams-Nobles, 459 B.R. 242, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (Santoro, J.), the extent of action required by a creditor with respect to a pending garnishment post-petition was not clear at the time Williams-Nobles was decided. In that case, a judgment creditor that had filed a garnishment received notice that the judgment debtor had filed a Chapter 7 petition. Id. at 243-44. Counsel for the debtor insisted that it was the judgment creditor’s affirmative duty to cause the garnishment to be dismissed and the garnished wages to be returned. Id. at 244. Creditor’s counsel called debtor’s counsel and said that the creditor would take no action against the debtor, and creditor’s counsel did nothing further. Id. Debtor’s counsel did not prepare an order dismissing the garnishment or engage in any further discussions with creditor’s counsel. Instead, debtor’s counsel filed a motion seeking to hold the judgment creditor in contempt for failing to dismiss the garnishment. Id. After observing that “the continuation of a garnishment proceeding against a debtor is a violation of the automatic stay,” Judge Santoro held that this principle did not impose a duty on the judgment creditor to prepare the dismissal order. Id. at 246. Instead, Judge Santoro held that judgment creditors cannot refuse to endorse an order dismissing the garnishment after it has been prepared by counsel for the debtor. Id. at 246-47. In the process, Judge Santoro reminded us that many disputes can be avoided or resolved by the use of common sense and professional courtesy. Id. at 247.

While a failure to communicate substantially contributed to the dispute in Williams-Nobles, lack of prompt action taken by both the debtor and creditor played a large role in the outcome of Jones v. Tri-City Auto Sales (In re Jones), 2012 WL 5993760 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2012) (Tice, J.). In Jones, the debtor filed a motion seeking turnover of a vehicle repossessed by the secured creditor pre-petition and seeking to recover damages for an alleged violation of the automatic stay. Id. at *1. The debtor filed its Chapter 13 petition on February 3, 2012, and requested the creditor to return the vehicle. Id. The debtor then waited to file the motion for turnover until March 5, 2012. Id. The vehicle was ultimately returned to the debtor on March 7, 2012. Id. The debtor alleged that the failure to turn over the vehicle at his request violated the automatic stay, and the creditor defended on the grounds that the requirement to turn over property is often conditioned upon the debtor’s provision of adequate protection. Id. at *2. The Court took issue with the delay by both parties in bringing the issues before the Court. Id. On the one hand, the creditor could have filed a motion for adequate protection under § 362(f); on the other hand, the debtor could have filed its motion for turnover more promptly. Id. at *3-4. As a result, the Court found that the creditor had willfully violated the stay but awarded the debtor attorney’s fees in a substantially reduced amount. Id. at *4.

Creditors also can escape liability by taking prompt and clear action in the context of administrative holds on a debtor’s bank accounts. In Jernigan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the debtor alleged that the creditor’s imposition of an administrative hold on three of the debtor’s accounts violated the automatic stay. Jernigan, 475 B.R. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2012) (Krumm, J.). Judge Krumm observed that where a hold is temporary and serves merely to “maintain the status quo and preserve property of the estate,” an administrative hold does not violate the automatic stay. Id. at 539 (quoting In re Phillips, 443 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010)). Because the creditor placed an administrative hold on the accounts and sent a letter to the Chapter 7 Trustee and the debtor’s counsel within four days of the petition date requesting instruction from the trustee regarding the funds, the Court held that the administrative hold did not violate the stay. Id. at 539-40.

While the cases above provide useful guidance in some common situations, the Court addressed fairly unique circumstances in In re Gordon Properties, LLC v. First Owners Association of Forty Six Hundred. There, the debtor owned several units in a condominium, but, as a result of miscalculation of dues payable to the owners’ association on one of the units, owed the association over $300,000.00 as of the petition date. 460 B.R. at 685. The association’s bylaws prohibited a delinquent unit owner from voting at any meeting of the members of the association. Id. at 685 n. 1. The board of directors of the association cancelled its first post-petition annual meeting because a quorum was not present; however, in calculating the number of members present, the board refused to count the debtor based on the bylaws. Id. at 687-89. The Court held that the enforcement of this provision was an act to collect a debt, id. at 693-94, and, as a result of the violation, held the association in contempt and awarded punitive damages of $100,000.00 with the opportunity to purge the award if the association held its annual meeting and gave the debtor the right to vote at that meeting. Id. at 699-700. In so holding, the Court cautioned that “[n]ot only are obvious acts . . . prohibited, but less direct acts are also prohibited.” Id. at 692.

In addition to establishing or reaffirming context-specific rules, the recent cases involving the discharge injunction and automatic stay provide guidance applicable to many disputes that arise in bankruptcy cases, and elsewhere. Common sense, prompt action, and professional courtesy can help debtors and creditors avoid time-consuming litigation. In addition, in situations where the requirements of the automatic stay are less than clear, the parties should file appropriate motions and seek guidance from the Courts.


See http://valawyersweekly.com/vlwblog/2013/02/05/bankruptcy-filings-down-in-virginia-u-s/ (last visited February 10, 2013).

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Appeals Court Upholds DMCA Protection For Veoh, Sidestepping YouTube

from forbes



Appeals Court Upholds DMCA Protection For Veoh, Sidestepping YouTube

Image representing Veoh as depicted in CrunchBase
Congratulations, you won. Image via CrunchBase
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today upheld its 2011 decision rejectingUniversal Music Group‘s lawsuit accusing Veoh of copyright infringement. The appeals court rejected UMG’s request for a rehearing, holding that the Digital Millenium Copyright Act protects web hosting firms like Veoh from lawsuits if they take down infringing material when they discover it.
The 61-page decision came too late for Veoh, which was backed by Time-Warner and former Disney Chief Michael Eisner but has been in financial limbo since filing for bankruptcy in 2010. It also artfully sidesteps a 2012 decision by an appeals court in New York that allowed Viacom‘s similar lawsuit against YouTube to proceed.
The main implication of the decision is it better spells out what companies must do and not do to remain within the broad protection of DMCA, saidGlenn Kulick of Kulik Gottesman & Siegel in Los Angeles, who represented Veoh investors that were also sued by UMG.
“It spells out how proactive they have to be in searching it out,” Kulick said of infringing material.
Veoh was entitled to protection under DMCA’s safe-harbor provisions because it used software to monitor uploads for infringing music and would shut off access to all copies of videos as soon as it discovered, or was notified, of copyright violations, the Ninth Circuit said. UMG, a unit of France‘sVivendi, had argued the DMCA didn’t apply because viewers could access copies of infringing material that users had stored, but the court said that would disqualify virtually every video site.
As Veoh’s backers including the Electronic Frontier Foundation noted, the court said,  “these access activities define web hosting– if the web host only stored information for a single user, it would be more aptly described as an online back-up service.”
The court first ruled in favor of Veoh in December 2011, upholding a lower court decision. Then the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed Viacom’s case to proceed against YouTube in April. That court held that a jury might decide YouTube lost its DMCA protection because it made money from uploaded videos and had the “right and ability to control such activity.”
The statute also requires websites to have “specific knowledge” of infringing material. UMG sued Veoh before notifying it of any allegedly infringing videos, the Ninth Circuit said, undermining the goal of DMCA in fostering cooperation between copyright owners and website operators.
“Of course a service provider cannot willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid obtaining such specific knowledge,” the Ninth Circuit went on, however, citing the Second Circuit’s decision favorably.   ”There is no evidence that Veoh acted in such a manner.”
Kulick said the Ninth Circuit wanted to rewrite its December 2011 opinion to incorporate specific arguments UMG made. But otherwise, “this is just reaffirming what they’d already won.”



Friday, March 8, 2013

Judge Alex Kozinski: From Communist Romania to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals





One of our most controversial jurists talks about free speech, cell phones, and how bubble gum made him a capitalist.

“Those of you who’ve had the good fortune to be born in the United States simply have not known the absence of freedoms,” says Judge Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “You can only imagine, but not experience, what it’s like to live in a society where these freedoms are absent.”
Born in 1950 to Holocaust survivors, Kozinski grew up as a committed communist in Bucharest, Romania. On his first trip outside of the Iron Curtain, in Vienna, Austria, he experienced forbidden luxuries like bubble gum and bananas. It was his first taste of freedom, and it caused him to become, in his words, “an instant capitalist.”
Today, Kozinski is responsible for some of the most influential - and controversial - legal decisions in the United States. Kozinski's rulings have challenged the Obama administrationover the issue of same-sex marriage. In a case that tested the limits of parody and artistic expression, he has weighed in on whether a Barbie doll qualifies as a sex object. In one of the most influential dissents in recent memory, he caused federal prosecutors to drop all charges against a defendant who'd been convicted of smuggling of illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican border. 
Kozinski sat down with Reason editor-in-chief Matt Welch during Reason Weekend in Las Vegas for a wide-ranging discussion about freedom and the law. How do mobile phones and cloud computing affect our right to privacy? Why do judges interpret the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution so broadly? What’s wrong with the practice of jury nullification?
Kozinski, a self-described libertarian, answers these questions, and many others, with the insight and wry humor that comes from decades of experience on the bench - and a childhood under communism.
About 50 minutes.
Produced by Todd Krainin. Camera by Meredith Bragg and Alex Manning.
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