Friday, November 9, 2012
Monday, September 3, 2012
Still No Justice for Mortgage Abuses
EDITORIAL
Published: September 1, 2012 135 Comments
It has been six months since the big banks settled with state and federal officials over evidence of widespread foreclosure fraud, promising to provide $25 billion in mortgage relief in exchange for not being sued over past foreclosure abuses.
Related News
Mortgage Plan Gives Billions to Homeowners, but With Exceptions (February 10, 2012)
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Readers shared their thoughts on this article.
At the time, it looked like a sweet deal for the banks. The fines were paltry compared with the damage done to homeowners and the economy. And much of the relief the banks were obliged to provide could be met by continuing more or less with business as usual.
It still looks like a sweet deal.
The Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight, the monitor of the settlement, released a preliminary report last week showing that 138,000 homeowners had received some form of relief from March 1 through June 30. That is roughly the number that would have been expected under various aid programs in effect before the settlement. Worse, with some three million borrowers now in or near foreclosure, according to Moody’s Analytics, it is nowhere near the level of relief needed to fix the housing market.
The type of relief provided — mostly short sales, in which a bank allows a homeowner to sell for less than is owed on the mortgage — had become increasingly common before the settlement.
Short sales are better than foreclosures, in part because they prevent vacancies that depress house values. But they are not punishment for wrongdoing in any meaningful sense; rather, they allow banks to get higher prices for underwater properties than they could have gotten in foreclosure sales.
Nor do they fulfill the settlement’s main purpose: to keep underwater borrowers in their homes by reducing the principal on their mortgage loans. According to the monitor’s report, $8.7 billion of debt has been written off in short sales versus only $750 million of principal reduction from loan modifications.
The settlement was not, of course, intended as a cure for the housing bust. And future progress reports will no doubt show many more homeowners receiving big loan modifications. But, based on the banks’ performance so far, it also seems likely they will be able to structure the required relief in ways designed to tidy up their balance sheets, rather than to save as many homes as possible.
Even the relief that is provided may turn out to be less than meets the eye. That’s because much of the debt forgiven in short sales and loan modifications will be counted as taxable income to the borrowers, creating huge tax bills they will not be able to pay.
Mortgage debt that is forgiven is exempt from taxation under current law, but only if the debt was used to buy or improve the house. The law does not exempt debt forgiven on many home equity loans, even though the foreclosure settlement envisions billions of dollars in modifications to such loans.
Several bills in Congress call for extending the law, which is set to expire at the end of the year. But what is obviously needed is a broader law shielding all forgiven mortgage debt from tax.
Meanwhile, an investigation into the mortgage abuses that led to the financial crisis, promised by President Obama in January, has been slow to produce results. The settlement left open the possibility of civil and criminal suits on mortgage securitizations and other practices that inflated the bubble. The aim is to produce deeper accountability and larger fines with which to provide even more mortgage relief, but no suits have yet been filed.
The economy will not recover and justice will not be done unless and until the mortgage mess is resolved.
Sunday, September 2, 2012
In re: Krista Lynn Purvis Complaint for Violation of Automatic Stay
AUG28
2012
WRITTEN BY ADMIN
2012
WRITTEN BY ADMININ THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: : CHAPTER SEVEN
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS : BANKRUPTCY NO.: 5-11-bk-04996-JJT
aka KRIS PURVIS, :
:
DEBTOR :
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS, : {Nature of Proceeding: Defendant’s
: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for
PLAINTIFF : Violations of the Automatic Stay Pursuant
: to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.B.P. 7012(b)
vs. : (Doc. #5)}
:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
:
DEFENDANT : ADVERSARY NO.: 5-11-ap-00488-JJT
OPINION1
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the underlying Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as made applicable to adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b). For the reasons set forth herein,
the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.
The allegations of the underlying Complaint for Violations of the Automatic Stay can be
summarized as follows. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition of July 18, 2011, the
Defendant scheduled a sheriff sale of Debtor’s property with the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s
Office with said sale being scheduled for October 4, 2011. Subsequent to the filing of the
bankruptcy, the Lackawanna County Sheriff, pursuant to Defendant’s instructions, posted a
Drafted with the assistance of Richard P. Rogers, Law Clerk.
1
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf]notice on Debtor’s property indicating that the property was to be sold on October 4, 2011.
Thereafter, on three separate occasions namely, September 9, September 16, and September 23,
2011, Debtor’s property was subject to an advertisement in the Scranton Times Tribune and the
Lackawanna County Jurist. The allegations are that the posting of the property and
advertisement of the Sheriff’s sale were all done pursuant to the requirements of a foreclosure
sale process.
2
The Complaint alleges that at all times subsequent to the filing of the underlying
bankruptcy case, the Defendant was aware of the filing of the bankruptcy. On September 15,
2011, Defendant even filed a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. It is further alleged
that on the morning of October 4, 2011, the day of the Sheriff’s sale, Defendant instructed the
Sheriff to continue the sale to November 15, 2011. Based upon these factual allegations, the
Plaintiff requests the Court find that the Defendant violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and as a result of
that violation, she should be awarded actual damages including costs, attorney’s fees, and
punitive damages. Defendant’s response attacks the allegations of the Complaint on several
avenues. First, Defendant argues that in order to receive damages, the Plaintiff must prove the
Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay, and the allegations of the Complaint falls short
in this regard. Defendant also asserts that both Pennsylvania State law and Bankruptcy lawis
clear that a scheduled Sheriff’s sale can be continued post-petition without there being a violation
of the automatic stay. Furthermore, the rescheduling of the sale is not a violation because the
In addition to the posting and advertising of the Debtor’s property at 82 Pike Street, Carbondale,
2
Pennsylvania, was the Plaintiff’s/Debtor’s parents’ property at 99 Pike Street, Carbondale, Pennsylvania. Debtor’s
parents are not debtors under the United States Bankruptcy Code, and Defendant was informed that the 99 Pike
Street property was incorrectly included in the foreclosure proceedings.
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 2action simply maintains the “status quo” between the debtor and the creditor. Closely tied to this
argument is that the Defendant took no affirmative action in violation of the stay but that it was
the Sheriff of Lackawanna County who did the postings for the sale.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Rule is that “once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the
complaint.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 at 1969 (2007).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.
The Court will “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at
233 citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 n.8 and Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361,
374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Plaintiff points outs that Defendant concentrates its argument solely on whether the
oral continuance of the Sheriff’s sale on October 4, 2011, served to protect the “status quo”
vis-à-vis the parties, while ignoring the impact the posting and triple advertisement of the
Sheriff’s sale in local papers may have had on the automatic stay. Defendant, however, deflected
attention from itself by indicating that it was actually the Sheriff that did the posting and the
advertising and minimized any responsibility of the Defendant in the state procedures leading to
the Sheriff’s sale, all the while ignoring the fact that the Sheriff operates at the behest of the
Defendant.
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 3Defendant also asserts the Debtor cannot and has not set forth any damages that occurred
to her as a result of the Sheriff’s sale being advertised or in the bankruptcy. We direct the
Defendant’s attention to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Complaint which set forth the allegations of
Plaintiff’s damages, and we find that under our previous rulings in the Solfanelli case at
Solfanelli v. Meridian Bank (In re Solfanelli), 206 B.R. 699, 703 (Bankr. M.D.Pa.. 1996), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, In re Solfanelli, 230 B.R. 54 (M.D.Pa. 1999), judgment aff’d and remanded,
Solfanelli v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 203 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2000), sufficient allegations remain in
support of the allegation of damages.
It is for these reasons that the Court finds the instant Complaint survives the requirements
of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion as set forth in Twombly, supra, and the Court will deny the instant
Motion to Dismiss. The Court will further Order the Defendant to file an Answer to the
Complaint on or within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
My Order will follow.
Date: May 30, 2012
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 4IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: : CHAPTER SEVEN
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS : BANKRUPTCY NO.: 5-11-bk-04996-JJT
aka KRIS PURVIS, :
:
DEBTOR :
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS, : {Nature of Proceeding: Defendant’s
: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for
PLAINTIFF : Violations of the Automatic Stay Pursuant
: to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.B.P. 7012(b)
vs. : (Doc. #5)}
:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
:
DEFENDANT : ADVERSARY NO.: 5-11-ap-00488-JJT
ORDER
For those reasons indicated in the Opinion filed this date, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Violations of
the Automatic Stay, (Doc. #5), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall an Answer to the Complaint on or
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
Date: May 30, 2012
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: : CHAPTER SEVEN
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS : BANKRUPTCY NO.: 5-11-bk-04996-JJT
aka KRIS PURVIS, :
:
DEBTOR :
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS, : {Nature of Proceeding: Defendant’s
: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for
PLAINTIFF : Violations of the Automatic Stay Pursuant
: to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.B.P. 7012(b)
vs. : (Doc. #5)}
:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
:
DEFENDANT : ADVERSARY NO.: 5-11-ap-00488-JJT
OPINION1
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the underlying Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as made applicable to adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b). For the reasons set forth herein,
the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.
The allegations of the underlying Complaint for Violations of the Automatic Stay can be
summarized as follows. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition of July 18, 2011, the
Defendant scheduled a sheriff sale of Debtor’s property with the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s
Office with said sale being scheduled for October 4, 2011. Subsequent to the filing of the
bankruptcy, the Lackawanna County Sheriff, pursuant to Defendant’s instructions, posted a
Drafted with the assistance of Richard P. Rogers, Law Clerk.
1
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf]notice on Debtor’s property indicating that the property was to be sold on October 4, 2011.
Thereafter, on three separate occasions namely, September 9, September 16, and September 23,
2011, Debtor’s property was subject to an advertisement in the Scranton Times Tribune and the
Lackawanna County Jurist. The allegations are that the posting of the property and
advertisement of the Sheriff’s sale were all done pursuant to the requirements of a foreclosure
sale process.
2
The Complaint alleges that at all times subsequent to the filing of the underlying
bankruptcy case, the Defendant was aware of the filing of the bankruptcy. On September 15,
2011, Defendant even filed a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. It is further alleged
that on the morning of October 4, 2011, the day of the Sheriff’s sale, Defendant instructed the
Sheriff to continue the sale to November 15, 2011. Based upon these factual allegations, the
Plaintiff requests the Court find that the Defendant violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and as a result of
that violation, she should be awarded actual damages including costs, attorney’s fees, and
punitive damages. Defendant’s response attacks the allegations of the Complaint on several
avenues. First, Defendant argues that in order to receive damages, the Plaintiff must prove the
Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay, and the allegations of the Complaint falls short
in this regard. Defendant also asserts that both Pennsylvania State law and Bankruptcy lawis
clear that a scheduled Sheriff’s sale can be continued post-petition without there being a violation
of the automatic stay. Furthermore, the rescheduling of the sale is not a violation because the
In addition to the posting and advertising of the Debtor’s property at 82 Pike Street, Carbondale,
2
Pennsylvania, was the Plaintiff’s/Debtor’s parents’ property at 99 Pike Street, Carbondale, Pennsylvania. Debtor’s
parents are not debtors under the United States Bankruptcy Code, and Defendant was informed that the 99 Pike
Street property was incorrectly included in the foreclosure proceedings.
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 2action simply maintains the “status quo” between the debtor and the creditor. Closely tied to this
argument is that the Defendant took no affirmative action in violation of the stay but that it was
the Sheriff of Lackawanna County who did the postings for the sale.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Rule is that “once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the
complaint.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 at 1969 (2007).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.
The Court will “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at
233 citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 n.8 and Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361,
374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Plaintiff points outs that Defendant concentrates its argument solely on whether the
oral continuance of the Sheriff’s sale on October 4, 2011, served to protect the “status quo”
vis-à-vis the parties, while ignoring the impact the posting and triple advertisement of the
Sheriff’s sale in local papers may have had on the automatic stay. Defendant, however, deflected
attention from itself by indicating that it was actually the Sheriff that did the posting and the
advertising and minimized any responsibility of the Defendant in the state procedures leading to
the Sheriff’s sale, all the while ignoring the fact that the Sheriff operates at the behest of the
Defendant.
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 3Defendant also asserts the Debtor cannot and has not set forth any damages that occurred
to her as a result of the Sheriff’s sale being advertised or in the bankruptcy. We direct the
Defendant’s attention to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Complaint which set forth the allegations of
Plaintiff’s damages, and we find that under our previous rulings in the Solfanelli case at
Solfanelli v. Meridian Bank (In re Solfanelli), 206 B.R. 699, 703 (Bankr. M.D.Pa.. 1996), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, In re Solfanelli, 230 B.R. 54 (M.D.Pa. 1999), judgment aff’d and remanded,
Solfanelli v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 203 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2000), sufficient allegations remain in
support of the allegation of damages.
It is for these reasons that the Court finds the instant Complaint survives the requirements
of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion as set forth in Twombly, supra, and the Court will deny the instant
Motion to Dismiss. The Court will further Order the Defendant to file an Answer to the
Complaint on or within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
My Order will follow.
Date: May 30, 2012
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf] 4IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: : CHAPTER SEVEN
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS : BANKRUPTCY NO.: 5-11-bk-04996-JJT
aka KRIS PURVIS, :
:
DEBTOR :
:
KRISTA LYNN PURVIS, : {Nature of Proceeding: Defendant’s
: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for
PLAINTIFF : Violations of the Automatic Stay Pursuant
: to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.B.P. 7012(b)
vs. : (Doc. #5)}
:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
:
DEFENDANT : ADVERSARY NO.: 5-11-ap-00488-JJT
ORDER
For those reasons indicated in the Opinion filed this date, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Violations of
the Automatic Stay, (Doc. #5), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall an Answer to the Complaint on or
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
Date: May 30, 2012
[K:\Cathy\Opinions-Orders filed 2012\5-11-ap-00488-JJT_Purvis.pdf
Monday, August 13, 2012
Subject: NY Dist Court - Suit for breach of contract and gross negligence managing a CDO, judgment reversed
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 11:28:54 -0700
In plaintiffs' suit for breach of contract and gross negligence based on defendant's alleged disregard of its obligation to manage the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) portfolio in favor of its investors, judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded where: 1) the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the parties to the contract intended the contract to benefit the investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from defendant to the investors; 2) plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the relationship between defendant and the plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort for defendant to manage the investment on behalf of plaintiffs; and 3) plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that plausibly suggest that defendant acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, ultimately leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs' losses.
See the attached.
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles@BayLiving.com
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax
See the attached.
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles@BayLiving.com
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax
Saturday, August 11, 2012
Homeless Glendora woman clears latest hurdle in illegal eviction case
Posted: 08/10/2012 11:04:21 PM PDT
Sharon Green, 70, lives in a tent with her cat, Furball, at Mountain Lakes Campground in Lytle Creek in San Bernardino National Forest. (Staff file photo)
Gallery: 70-year-old disabled woman lives in the mountains of Lytle Creek
Though the voyage is not yet over, Sharon Green and her legal team are declaring a big victory.
The California Supreme Court on Wednesday declined to review the Glendora woman's case against Anchor Pacifica Management Company and denied the city of Glendora's request to depublish the case. That should put the parties back on track to get Green into permanent housing, said Jolene Larimore, one of Green's attorneys.
Green has been homeless since being evicted from her affordable housing unit in Heritage Oaks Senior Apartments in 2010. A battle with Anchor Pacifica traveled all the way up to a California appeals court, which ruled that the 70-year-old had been illegally evicted from her unit.
The ruling from the Second District Court of Appeals declared that tenants in affordable housing units subsidized by redevelopment agencies are entitled to due process protections similar to the federal housing program rights.
Since the state disbanded redevelopment agencies last year, the appeals court chose to publish the case, setting it up as a precedent for all future cases.
As Green began making plans to move from her camping tent in Lytle Creek to an apartment with a
Advertisement
With the denial of the depublication request, the city of Glendora is now waiting for the judgment from the Superior Court, said Glendora City Attorney D. Wayne Leech.
Larimore submitted a proposed judgment ordering Anchor Pacifica to reinstate Green to her tenancy as it was the day before her eviction, at the affordable housing rate of $213 a month.
Though the proposed judgment orders the city of Glendora to pay the subsidy as the redevelopment agency's successor, the judge could simply decree that the issue of rent must be decided between the landlord and tenant, Larimore said.
"Our next move depends on whether the city believes there is any legal obligation to provide subsidies to Sharon Green," said Leech. "The city has never provided a subsidy to Sharon Green. We've never had an agreement with Sharon Green for providing her any housing."
Until the judgment is decreed, Green waits in a motel in Glendora, paid for by Anchor Pacifica on a weekly basis, said Green's other attorney, Andrew Radel. Aside from the temporary accommodations, there has been limited contact between the two parties.
"We really haven't had any discussions," Radel said. "The only thing we know is the judge is ready to sign the judgment and he believes, as we do, they're (Anchor Pacifica) going to have to move her back in."
Anchor Pacifica did not return calls for comment.
melissa.masatani@sgvn.com
626-962-8811, ext. 2472
Thursday, July 26, 2012
Looking into the minds of killers
updated 9:53 AM EDT, Wed July 25, 2012
The public gets its first glimpse of James Holmes, 24, the suspect in the Colorado theater shooting during his initial court appearance Monday, July 23. With his hair dyed reddish-orange, Holmes, here with public defender Tamara Brady, showed little emotion. He is accused of opening fire in a movie theater Friday, July 20, in Aurora, Colorado, killing 12 people and wounding 58 others. STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- People are asking what triggered the Aurora shooting
- Jeffrey Swanson: Looking inside the killer's mind will not turn up the answer
- He says most violence is not caused by a major psychiatric condition
- Swanson: True "reasons" that motivated killer's terrible act may be unknowable
Editor's note: Jeffrey Swanson is a professor in psychiatry and behavioral sciences at Duke University's School of Medicine.
(CNN) -- A witness to the horrific shooting rampage in the Colorado movie theater called it "the longest minute" of his life. One can only imagine. But the second longest minute may be the waiting for someone -- the authorities, the pundits, the doctors -- to tell us "why" these killings happened. Police say James Holmes, a 24-year-old graduate student in a neurosciences program, called himself the Joker and rained merciless bullets on strangers watching a Batman movie. Why?
Already, the speculations are flooding in. There's a celebrity psychiatrist saying it was a "failure of empathy" likely rooted in the shooter's early life psychological pain. What about asking the accused shooter's parents? "Listen, these folks that are now flying to join their son in Colorado, if you were to ask them, 'What three things are you most sensitive about not telling people, about your family or your son's personal development, or the things that are most painful to relate' -- there's your answer."
Jeffrey Swanson
Another psychiatrist thinks that people who commit crimes like this are "unfailingly unable to form satisfying sexual attachments, and their masculinity essentially gets replaced with their fascination for destruction."
Big Religion has also weighed in. "The product of pure evil ... a depraved individual taking his free will to the extreme," says the president of Focus on the Family. The head of the Southern Baptists commented that the incident "tells the truth about unbridled human sin."
They should all shut up. Let the police work. Let a competent clinician conduct a private evaluation. Let the professional reporters find out what really happened.
On the face of it, a deliberate rampage to kill strangers is the act of a deviant consciousness of some kind. But we don't know whether the accused killer's mind may have been driven by acute symptoms of a psychiatric disorder that impairs thought and perception of reality, by a personality misshaped through a troubled past, or by something else entirely. We simply don't know.
What we do know, based on the best available scientific evidence on the link between violence and mental illness in populations, is that most violence is not caused by a major psychiatric condition like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or depression. Psychiatric disorder accounts for only about 4% of violent behavior, across the spectrum from minor to serious assaultive acts. And the vast majority of people with serious mental illnesses do not behave violently.
If research on patterns of violence in populations tells us anything, it's that no single thing causes assaultive behavior. Even when serious psychopathology plays a role, it is almost never a sufficient explanation. Other variables -- personal background characteristics and life experience, features of the social environment, substance abuse -- all may interact to make violent acts statistically more likely. That makes it complicated to explain and very difficult to predict actions on an individual level.
After the fact, rare and appalling acts of violence somehow look predictable, and thus, preventable. It is natural to turn to the experts, but they always come up short. They are notoriously bad at forecasting even garden variety violence, to say nothing of finding the one-in-a-million would-be mass shooter.
When we total up the contributions of all the risk factors with known links to violent behavior, most of it is left unexplained. When we describe the common characteristics of mass shooters, we're left with a profile that fits tens of thousands of troubled young men who would never actually do such a senseless thing.
"When we describe the common characteristics of mass shooters, we're left with a profile that fits tens of thousands of troubled young men who would never actually do such a senseless thing."
Is Holmes a psychopath? The true "reasons" that motivated the terrible act of which he is accused may always remain obscure. But what should not be obscure is how easy it is for troubled young men legally to acquire a small arsenal of firearms in the United States. If Holmes hadn't been able to get his hands on the guns police say he used, this would be a different story .
People can disagree about whether 270 million firearms in private hands in the country is too many guns. But they should not disagree that 300,000 people dying from gunshots in the past decade is too many wasted lives. The notion of forbidding assault weapons and large-capacity ammunition magazines -- machines specifically designed to kill multiple people in the twinkling of an eye -- is not about infringing the Second Amendment. It is about common sense and protecting the public. Such weapons were successfully legally banned in the United States from 1994 to 2004; they should be banned again.
Still, dangerous guns per se are not the only problem, and banning them is only part of the solution. We also need better means of identifying dangerous people who should not have access to guns.
Research shows that one of the highest risk times for violence in people who develop a psychotic illness is their first episode -- the period right before they establish any record with the formal mental health care system. Gun laws such as the federal Brady Act that are implemented through background record searches won't find these individuals. But even having a formal record of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is no guarantee that the relevant information will be available at the point of purchase of a firearm.
In Colorado, only a tiny fraction (about 1%) of people who have gun-disqualifying mental health histories have been reported to the National Instant Check System, where they could be discovered in a routine background check of a prospective gun purchaser. A felony conviction is also supposed to disqualify people from buying a gun, but only 40% of murder suspects have such a previous record of conviction.
The present national moment of grief and soul searching should not become another occasion for oversimplifying the problem of gun violence and laying the blame on any one thing -- "it's the guns" or "it's untreated mental illness" or "it's the information system" or "it's the violent popular culture in society." It may be all of those things. We need to address all of the variables and come up with smart evidence-based policies. Looking inside the killer's head should not be the first place to start.
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